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TO REPRESENT AS SO
Agreement … in judgement is part of communication. (Investigations §242)
Throughout Wittgenstein had Frege in mind. We should too, to understand him. This is 
as true for Philosophical Investigations as for the Tractatus. In fact, the later work is, in an 
important way, closer to Frege than the first—even though the Investigations  makes a 
target of what seems  a central Fregean idea. It directs Frege’s own ideas at that target, 
using something deeply right in Frege to undo a misreading of what, rightly read, are 
mere truisms.
The Tractatus  presents a view of what it is, essentially, to represent as so. The 
Investigations, I will suggest, presents a different view, but on the same topic. 
Wittgenstein, of course, rejects essences, on some conceptions, in some employments:
“You speak of language games … but never arrive at saying what 
the essence of a language game, and thus of language, is. What is in 
common to all these processes and which makes them all language, 
or parts of language. So you let yourself off that part of the 
investigation which used to give you the biggest headache, namely 
what to say concerning the general form of a proposition  and of 
language.”
And that is true.—Instead of specifying what is in common to all 
that which we call language, I say that all these phenomena have 
nothing in common in virtue of which we use the same word for all 
… (§65)
We see that what we call ‘proposition’, ‘language’, is not the formal 
unity I had imagined. (§108)
But he also says,
It is part of what communication is, not only that there is agreement 
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in definitions, but also (strange as this may sound) agreement in 
judgements. (§242)
It is hard to do philosophy, even of a new sort, while espousing no commitment to what 
things—in this case, propositions, representing—are as such. As we shall see, what I 
have just quoted is a view of this. The Investigations opens with a fundamental point—a 
thesis—which paves the way for this.
1. The Opening Move:  The Investigations  makes its first point by deploying a notion, 
language game. The items it thus deploys to make its point are fictions, precisely what 
they are said to be; best thought of as identified by how they are to be played. It will 
help here  to think of each as containing some specified set of moves, each move 
governed by specified rules, these jointly fixing how the game is to be played. A game is 
thus just what its rules make it. Those rules spell out a notion of correctness: a move is 
correct, on this notion, if it conforms to the rules which govern it. A language game may 
have a given point; something to be achieved in playing it. Such can  sometimes give 
sense to the idea that there is something its rules ought to be.
For present purposes, language games are (as Wittgenstein repeatedly insists) 
objects of comparison. We speak of them to serve philosophic ends. (See §§81, 130, 131.) 
To think of them as fixed by their rules, apart from any playing of them is just to assign 
them a particular role in the comparisons to be made. One thing they may accomplish, 
thus conceived, is to make perspicuous ways for representing to connect to action. For 
this end, and for suitably chosen games, we may think of the rules governing a move as 
dividing into introduction and elimination rules. An introduction rule specifies under 
what circumstances a move would be made correctly. It may say, say, that a player may 
say ‘Slab here’ only if there is a slab at some specific place. The elimination rule specifies 
what must, or may, be done if the move in question was correctly made. The prescribed 
consequences of the move may just be more talking. But they may be actions of various 
non-linguistic kinds. A correct move ‘Slab!’ in some game might, e.g., require bringing a 
slab to a certain point. In ways I will try to bring out, connections with action are central 
to a representation’s content being what it is (or, indeed, to its being anything at all). So, 
that a language game may connect words with action in a given way is an important 
feature of it, given the purposes it will serve in the Investigations.
I begin now on the basic point. One half of it is stated in §10:
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Now what do the words of this language designate?—What is 
supposed to show what they signify, if not the kind of use they 
have? And we have already described that. So we are asking for the 
expression “This word designates this” to be made a part of the 
description. In other words the description ought to take the form: 
“The word … designates …”.
As said already, the fundamental point at the start of the Investigations  departs from 
Frege. But we see already how the point is made by taking very seriously another on 
which Wittgenstein and Frege agree. Frege made the point this way:
What is distinctive about my conception of logic is that I begin by 
giving pride of place to the content of the word ‘true’, and then 
immediately go on to introduce a thought as that to which the 
question ‘Is it true?’ is in principle applicable. So I do not begin with 
concepts and put them together to form a thought or judgement; I 
come by the parts of a thought by analysing the thought. (Frege 
1919/1979 p. 253)
A thought, for Frege, is, in this sense, the fundamental unit of analysis. In just this sense, 
a whole move in a language game is the fundamental unit of analysis when it comes to 
content. What does this mean?
Suppose that, taking a thought (judgement, proposition) as fundamental, we ask 
the question whether such-and-such is an element of such-and-such thought—for 
example, whether Frege, or something naming him, is an element of a proposition that 
Frege smoked. If the proposition comes first, we can begin with when it  would be 
correct, in that distinctive way in which a proposition, as such, is liable to be correct. For 
a given proposition, there is such a thing as things being as they are according to it. The 
distinctive sort of correctness, seen one way, just consists, for it, in things being as they 
are according to it. So thinking, we can say: for Frege, or something representing him, to 
be an element of a given proposition just is for him, or it, to make (or be correctly 
viewable as making) a particular identifiable contribution to when things would  be as 
that proposition has them: whether things being is they are is their being that way turns 
on how Frege thus is. The proposition has an element naming Frege just where that 
element so works to make the condition on that proposition’s correctness what it is.
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As Frege notes, what the elements of a given proposition are is all relative to an 
analysis. There are two points here. First, there might  be various alternative ways of 
carving up a whole proposition into parts. For to carve a proposition into parts is just to 
divide up its  main task—being true (correct) just when it would be—into identifiable 
sub-tasks: the elements, on that carving, are just what perform, respectively, these sub-
tasks. A thought that Sid grunts would be true just where Sid grunted. So it would be 
true just where Sid is a given way. A sub-task can thus be making its truth thus turn on 
Sid. It would be true just where someone was a grunter. So a sub-task can be to make its 
truth turn on whether someone or other grunts. These tasks, if performed jointly, make 
the whole true just where Sid grunts. To be an element of a proposition on this analysis 
just is to perform (or perhaps be) one of these sub-tasks. That a proposition’s task can be 
parcelled out into sub-tasks in some given way does not preclude also parcelling it out 
differently. Any such parcelling out what the proposition does into sub-tasks would be a 
correct analysis on it, on which what performed some sub-task thus identified would be 
an element of the proposition.
If elements are what one thus carves out of a proposition, on some division of its 
job into sub-tasks, there is no intelligible question as to how the elements of a 
proposition (on an analysis) can form that unity which the proposition itself is. For there 
is nothing it could be for something to be an element other than to contribute to that 
unity. The element has no identity other than as that which performs such-and-such 
sub-task.
The second point here is Frege’s context principle (cited by Wittgenstein in §49). 
An element of the thought that Sid grunts can make the truth of that whole turn on 
whether Sid is some way or other only in concert with some other element making the 
truth of that whole turn on whether someone  is such-and-such way—say, a grunter. 
There is no such thing as making truth turn on how Sid is apart from any way it is so to 
turn. Words which made the truth of a whole turn on whether Sid was some way might 
be said to name  Sid. Similarly, words making the truth of a whole turn on whether 
someone was a grunter might be said to name being a grunter. By analogy one might say 
the same for an element of a proposition, or of a thought. Where naming is of logical 
significance, to name X just is to perform some such role. Naming so conceived could be 
done only in the context of a whole in which elements, in naming what they did, jointly 
performed the task that whole did—here being true just when that whole would be. In 
that sense, naming cannot be done in isolation. This is the context principle.
A move in a language game is the basic unit in the game in just the same way as a 
proposition (thought) is the basic unit in thinking. For something to be an element of a 
move is for it to contribute, in some definite way, to the conditions for the correctness of 
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that whole move. All the above remarks apply to this. This is Wittgenstein’s point in 
§49. For an element of a move to name something just is for it to play a particular logical 
role in that whole move—to have a particular place in a particular parcelling out of the 
task of the whole move into sub-tasks. If an element of a move names X, does that fact 
identify a unique role as the one it thus performs? That is the main question to be 
addressed. First, though, I will pause for a moment over a different conception of what 
it is to be an element.
2. Occam’s Razor: This second conception is what Wittgenstein refers to in the Tractatus 
as ‘Occam’s Razor’ (3.328, 5.47321). He stated it clearly in January 1930. (See Waismann 
1979, p. 90.) It is there put thus. For something to be an element in a proposition is for 
that proposition itself to be an element in some specific system of propositions. For the 
proposition to contain that element is (inter alia) for there to be, within that system, a 
range of propositions which are the same in some determinate respect. The element thus 
shared is, or identifies, that respect. For there to be that element is for there to be that 
way for those propositions (the range) to be the same. For it to occur in that proposition 
is for that proposition to belong to that range, within this system.
To be an element of a proposition, on Frege’s view, just is to contribute, in a way 
there is for an  element to  contribute, to the truth conditions of a whole. That way of 
contributing, Frege insists, is detachable from its occurrence in that whole. There could 
be a range of cases of an element contributing in that way. So far, this does not require 
there to be such a thing as the  range (or set of them), or the system, which is that to 
which the whole thus analysed belongs. For one thing, for Frege, the same proposition 
may be analysed in many ways—and would fit in different ranges of propositions on 
each. Nor is it some Fregean quirk to allow for multiple analyses. If a proposition were, 
essentially, such-and-such construction out of such-and-such building blocks, it would 
not have the pride of place Frege sees for it. One could give no more than lip-service to 
that idea of pride of place.
Tractarian Wittgenstein cannot share this view. For, as he says in January 1930, “It 
is the essential feature of a proposition that it is a picture and has compositeness.” (Ibid.) 
That is part of his conception, there, of what it is for a proposition to represent: it 
represents what its elements name as structured just  as that proposition is by its 
elements. There is an identity of structure between that of what is so if the proposition is 
true and that proposition itself. Such a proposition must be built up in just one way, of 
just one set of parts. Different structurings of parts are ipso facto structurings of different 
propositions. Merely insisting that a proposition occupies a particular place in a 
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particular system does not guarantee that this is so. A whole system of propositions 
might divide into sets of ranges, each of propositions the same in some respect, in 
different ways on different analyses of it. The whole system might admit of multiple 
analyses just as, for Frege, a proposition does. If it is the system that is to guarantee the 
uniqueness Tractarian Wittgenstein needs, something else must guarantee that the 
system decomposes uniquely into some one set of such ranges.
We are left with this in common to Frege and Tractarian Wittgenstein: an element 
of a proposition performs a role which is one for an element to perform in a proposition; 
a role thus admitting of further exemplars. A role is essentially detachable from an 
occurrence of it. Let us now put this idea to new use. I have spoken, so far, of two ideas 
of an element, each of which leaves it open that the same  proposition might be 
structured in different ways, out of different elements. What, aside from a particular 
structuring of particular elements, identifies a given proposition as the one it is? We 
began with one feature of a proposition: when things would be as it has them. We might 
cite that as an answer. But there is another (non-rival) view available.
Frege remarks in “Der Gedanke” (1918): to judge something is to expose oneself to 
the risk of error. (This happens in two steps. To judge of an environment is to run the risk 
of error; an environment (as he has just argued before making that point) is all there is, 
or could be, to judge about. (See my forthcoming.)) A proposition is the content of a 
judgement, detachable, Frege insists (1915/1979: 51), from any particular judging of it. 
So a proposition is a way for a thinker to be exposed to risk of error.
The idea of an element as a respect in which some range of items are the same can 
now come into play. A proposition represents a particular, determinate, exposure there 
is to suffer to the risk of error. So it  is a way in which a range of things would be the 
same. Which things? Each of us, at a time, occupies his own position of exposure to risk: 
each of us is exposed  to risk of error, and exposed as he is. For each, there is his own 
distinctive way in which plans may go awry, actions may miss their mark, surprises 
may be in store. If today is Friday, I am in my own particular sort of trouble. (Proofs due 
by noon.) A proposition represents a determinate way for such distinctive individual 
exposures to be the same; so a range of cases of a thinker being exposed in the same 
way. The proposition identifies, and is identified by, that understanding of the same. 
(This is already to rule out the possibility of ‘private language’.)
I think today is Thursday. I am not alone. Each of us who thinks so is thus exposed 
to a different specific form of trouble. Which of us, in risking what we in fact do, 
instances just this particular shape of stance towards things? What risk would one run in 
judging today Thursday? I leave that, momentarily, open.
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Language games are apt for capturing specifics of exposure to risk of error. A 
move in one identifies common elements in different thinkers differently than a 
proposition does. If a proposition is that the flat is dark, what risk does one run in 
supposing it? When would one be running just that risk? Well, you risk your hand just 
wherever your  answer to the question what the thing for you to do is depends on 
whether things are as that proposition has it. Where is that?
Consider the film-developing game. Two players go through a series of moves, at 
the end of which, if all is well, film has been developed. In the game there is a move, 
‘The room is dark’. By its elimination rule, player 2 may remove film from its canister 
and place it in developer. When one removes film from a canister (for this purpose), 
there is a way in which darkness matters to whether one’s project will go awry. So, with 
this project in view, there is a way in which darkness matters to whether removing the 
film is the thing for one to do. If we were designing a game that was to have this 
envisioned end, then, that elimination rule settled, there is something the move’s 
introduction rule ought to be. Let us now suppose we have made the introduction rule 
accordingly. You are playing the game. The room is dark enough for you to bump into 
things unintentionally. Objects loom as shadows. May you make the move, ‘The room is 
dark’, correctly? Not according to the rule we would thus have made. Those conditions 
would spoil film.
If, in the game, you make the move, ‘The room is dark’, you are in error just in case 
you breach the imagined introduction rule. But now that will be just where relying on 
the room’s being dark where it bears on the thing for you to do would lead to doing the 
wrong thing—what missed its mark—where that thing was what the elimination rule 
licensed, and the mark was what showed here what the introduction rule ought to be. 
In the case at hand, this is just where opening the canister would spoil film.
What of our envisioned proposition  that the room is dark? Again, in supposing it 
you are in error just where, in fact, things are not as they are according to it. But that 
introduction rule for it has not yet been linked to any elimination rules by the route just 
covered for the above move in the game. So would (supposing) that proposition be in 
error in the circumstances just envisioned—objects looming as shadows, barked shins, 
etc.? Nothing said so far about what proposition it is decides this.
3. Frege’s Limitations:  Consider the proposition that Sid grunts. How might this 
decompose? Perhaps into a part which makes it about Sid, and one which makes it 
about being a grunter. Making a proposition about Sid could count as naming him. 
Similarly for naming being a grunter (a way for someone to be).
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To be an element of a proposition is to play a logical role. So to name Sid is to play 
some logical role. To be an element of a proposition is to make some determinate 
contribution to its condition for correctness (truth). It is to be part of a particular way of 
parcelling out that condition into sub-parts. Is to name such-and-such to make some 
one such contribution? If I say that an element names such-and-such, have I thereby 
said what its contribution to its whole is?
Here we come to an idea of Frege’s which, from late Wittgenstein’s point of view, 
is a bad one (on one straightforward reading). It damages the good idea of a proposition 
enjoying pride of place which Frege and Wittgenstein share. If we accept everything 
Frege says on this question, then what an element of a proposition names does 
determine what its contribution to its whole is. There is just one such contribution thus 
to make. For Frege, in the simple sort of case now on hand, logical roles fall into two 
categories: naming objects, and naming concepts. If, in the present case, there is an 
element which names Sid, then there must be another which names a concept. This 
would be the element proposed, above, as naming being a grunter. Naming Sid is 
identifying what it is that has to be some way or other (for the proposition to be true); 
naming that other element is identifying which way something or other must be.
So far, so good. Now the fatal step. For Frege, a concept is a function, namely, one 
from objects to truth values. (See Frege 1891.) If words ‘Sid grunts’ decompose into an 
element ‘Sid’, which names an object, and an element ‘grunts’, which names a function 
from objects to truth-values, then the whole, ‘Sid grunts’, names the value of that 
function for a certain argument, namely, Sid. Which is to say that it names a truth-value: 
true if Sid grunts, false if he does not. Which is to say that for parts jointly to play these 
roles is, ipso facto, for them to decide a unique and determinate truth condition for their 
whole. Mutatis mutandis for propositions, of which words ‘Sid grunts’ could be but one 
instance, or expression. Which is why Frege’s answer to the question must be yes.
Not that taking concepts for functions is at all quirky. It is a natural reading of a 
truism: to apply a concept to (predicate something of) an object is to say (or think) the 
object to be thus and so; which it is (if it is) or is not (if not) purely in being as it is. Only 
the object’s being as it is makes that predication true or false. On the reading of this 
truism, a concept thus behaves as a function would: fix the object it applies to, and you 
fix the truth-value such application takes. To see this as misreading, one must first find 
another. To which task we now turn.
In matters of decomposition (on the view late Wittgenstein and Frege share), a 
proposition and a move in a language game raise exactly the same questions. So we 
may now ask this. Suppose there is a move in a language game—say, ‘The room is 
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dark’—which we have decomposed, somehow, into parts, and that, for each part we 
have identified something it in fact names (on that analysis). For example, on our 
analysis, ‘the room’ names a certain room, ‘is dark’ names (the property, or concept, or 
whatever, of) being dark. Have we fixed what the correctness (truth) condition for the 
move is? Do our parts, in jointly so  functioning, uniquely, or univocally, fix some one 
such condition?
Clearly not. For we can imagine two games. In the first, if I have made the move, 
‘The room is dark’, correctly, then I am excused from carrying out certain orders. For 
example, I need not bring you your copy of Zettel, on grounds that I cannot see to find 
it. In the second, if I have made the move correctly, then you may remove the film from 
its canister (and rely on doing so safely). Let us suppose that each game is well 
constructed: the move is made correctly in it just in case there would, in fact, be those 
consequences (or at least such consequences would be to be expected). Then the 
correctness conditions for the move must differ from the one game to the other. For I 
may be, reasonably, unable to find you copy of Zettel (knowing it is on the shelf) where 
it is quite unsafe for you to remove the film.
One might correctly say of either game that in it ‘is dark’ names (speaks of) being 
dark. But the role it plays in naming this differs from the one game to the other. In the 
one game, but not the other, it contributes to a condition on being as said which is not 
satisfied if, where whether to remove film turns on whether the room is dark, removing 
film is not the thing to do. So if a move consists (on an analysis) of parts, for each of 
which there is a such-and-such it names, those facts about the move are compatible with 
any of indefinitely many mutually exclusive conditions on correctness (answers to the 
question when things would be as thus said).
The point is general. That words name such-and-such determines no unique 
contribution which is that which such words make to conditions on the correctness of 
the whole they thus are part of. Such is just part of what naming is. It holds equally for 
naming in the context of a move in a language game, and naming in the context of a 
proposition. The fact of my speaking of being dark is compatible with my saying any of 
many things in, and by, doing so. There are many different things, each of which being 
dark may, sometimes correctly, be taken to be (or come to). Being dark admits of 
understandings. The same goes for being a grunter. On Witgenstein’s new view 
representation, these are to be taken as illustrating something intrinsic to the idea of a 
way for a thing to be; if a concept is identified by what it is of, then something intrinsic 
to the notion concept. Investigations opens with this point. It is the first point the idea of a 
language game is used to make. It advances us far towards our emerging new picture of 
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representing as so.
We needed a new reading of a truism to see how it could be a misreading to make 
concepts into functions. We now have it. It is on an application of a concept to an object, 
on an occasion, that one says the object to be thus and so. The rest of the truism then 
holds. The concept as such admits of many applications, each excluding others. So it 
alone cannot assign an object, in being as it is, a truth value.
4. Comparisons:  Words may name in the context of a proposition (or its expression). 
May they also name in the context of a language (such as English or French)? Not in the 
same sense. For a language asserts nothing, thus neither correctly nor incorrectly. Our 
fundamental point about naming makes this no mere nicety. The words ‘is dark’, in the 
context of a move in a particular game, contribute to a particular condition of 
correctness. That is what it is for them to name, in the sense in which they may name in 
such a context. What the English words ‘is dark’ mean does not choose between 
different conditions of correctness such as the two just indicated. The English ‘The room 
is dark’ is governed no more by one such condition than by any other. So there cannot 
be ‘the proposition they express’. They can be used to express various  propositions, 
where the use in question fixes just how one may be in error in speaking of such-and-
such as dark; some one such condition on correctness.
But there is  truth to tell in saying the English ‘is dark’ to name (speak of) being 
dark. Here naming is not playing a role in some given thought. Aspects make the 
difference here. There is a switch in my kitchen which turns the dishwasher on and off. 
This does not make me apprehensive as to what the switch may be up to while I am 
away. If I did worry, I would be missing the aspect with which ‘turns on’ occurs in that 
expression of truth. The point thus made is: to turn the dishwasher on, or off, flip that 
switch. Turning the dishwasher on and off is what the switch is for. Similarly (at least at 
first approximation) for the English ‘is dark’. English does not go around telling people 
things. I need not worry whether English can keep an Oxford secret. But if you want to 
tell someone something, and it is to your purpose to speak of something being dark, 
then, if you are speaking English, uttering the words ‘is dark’ will generally be a way of 
doing so. That is what they are for.
Crucially, there is no particular thing you have to be in course of saying in order to 
use ‘is dark’ to speak of being dark, just so long as speaking of being dark has a role in 
saying it. It does not matter whether you are speaking of a room being dark in a way 
that would license opening film canisters, or merely in a way that would excuse your 
failing to find Zettel on the shelf. English is indifferent to such things. It is, as one might 
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say, plastic. Which is why it is so useful. To put things (so far) picturesquely, we might 
say: the words ‘is dark’ would speak of what they do in English, in any move in any 
language game, provided only that, in that move, they speak of (name) being dark.
What language games are played in some speaking ‘The room is dark’ (in speaking 
English)? The notion playing a language game in speaking English  is not yet defined. It is 
(normally) not as if, where I say, ‘The room is dark’, we have agreed to speak according 
to such-and-such rules. Nor does English provide the rules of some game for us then to 
play. But we can think of playing a game in another way. If, in given circumstances, I 
say of a given room, ‘The room is dark’, the rules of a game with that rule may be such 
that I would thus have spoken truly only if I would have moved correctly by those 
rules. Such rules identify some of what it would be for things to be as I said. We might 
speak of that move, so that game, as modelling my words.
In the game, if ‘The room is dark’ is said correctly, another player may remove 
film. A parallel condition can govern what someone said: things are  as he said only if 
removing film (for developing) can be the thing to do, insofar as this turns on the 
present darkness of the room. (That there is no other way the film will be spoiled need 
not be in this bargain.) Such may be a condition on the correctness of what one says in 
calling the room dark. It contributes to an  understanding of what it would be for the 
room to be as thus said. When I call the room dark, I may be said, in this sense, to be 
playing any game which thus captures some of what it would be for things to be as I 
thus say. By that measure, I might correctly be said to be playing indefinitely many 
different games.
Where I speak of the room being dark, I must do so on some understanding of it so 
being. The language games I thus play, on our current understanding of playing one, 
may make explicit some of what that understanding is. Their elimination rules show 
some of how things would be if as I said: what is licensed or demanded by them is what 
one can, or must, do so far as that turns on things being as said. Their introduction rules 
must then be what these elimination rules require. If I said things to be thus and so, 
things would  be that way, on the understanding on which I said so just where those 
introduction rules permitted saying so.
Where I speak of a room as dark, there are things you may expect if I am right, 
among which ways you may, on the occasion, expect this to bear on the things for you 
to do. Licensing such expectations is a way of exposing oneself to risk of error. An 
identifiable such exposure may be a common element in a range of cases of thinkers 
taking things to be as they do. It may thus identify something to be thought or said—a 
proposition. For a given way for  things to be—thus and so—there are many such 
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exposures to risk one may incur in taking things to be that way, so many propositions. 
There are many ways of exposing oneself in taking a room to be dark.
Supposing this point to hold for any  things words might name (in speaking of 
sublunary affairs), and a concept to be what one names in speaking of a determinate 
way for things to be, a concept cannot be a function from objects to truth values. The 
fact of having named one cannot by itself fix when what one thus said of something 
would be true of it. Logic is so built that, when it speaks to particular thoughts, it 
requires treating what plays the role of a concept (on an analysis of a thought) to be 
such a function. Which means that when we apply logic, that to which we do so must 
be, for our purpose, viewable in those terms. So far as matters to an application, it may 
be as if ‘is red’, as such, has some definite extension. Concepts are sometimes treatable 
as functions. That is another way an identification may be understood. Which suggests, 
perhaps, another way of reading Frege.
There are as many games to play in calling a room dark as there are things one 
might  understand by a room being dark. Who is ‘one’ here? When I speak, there are 
those my words are for; for whom they should  be usable as they ought to be. I cannot 
speak to people on understandings of being dark they cannot grasp, or could not 
recognize as understandings of being dark. On the other hand, for anything those my 
words are for would sometimes understand being dark to be, I can sometimes speak of 
being dark on that understanding of it. This remark fits together with another. We 
sometimes recognize someone as having spoken of a room as dark, while also 
recognizing certain things as to when things would be as he said. We are constrained 
here by the limits of our ability to understand being dark in different ways. Those limits 
are also the limits of our ability to take an audience as having taken being dark  to be 
what was spoken of. Our limits here, and those of those for whom I speak, are fixed by 
an entirely parochial sense for when it would be being dark that was in question. To call 
such a sense parochial is to say that sharing it is not part of being a thinker as such. A 
being would not fail to be a thinker merely in lacking it. The sense in question is part of 
our  equipment for engaging with the world; for all of which, what it helps pull off is 
engagement with the world.
Where I did say ‘The room is dark’, what standard of correctness governed it? 
Only the parochial can answer this. I tell you the room is dark. You pry the lid from the 
canister. The light on the smoke detector blinks. No one will ever see that judge’s 
peccadilloes. Did I speak on an understanding of being dark on which the room was 
that? Is  there such an understanding? If I spoke understandably, there are those 
equipped to understand me. There are things such fellows would be prepared to 
recognize—say, that there is an understanding on which the room was dark, and 
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another on which it was not; that, circumstances what they were, I ought to have been 
taken, or one had a right to take me, to be speaking in the second way. In which case, 
things were not as I said.
There need not always be such outcomes. Those for whom I speak need not 
always see such things in one way rather than another. But sometimes there are. I call 
the room dark. The canister is opened. The tabloids have their field day. Is  there an 
understanding of being dark on which, for all that, the room was not dark? That may be 
hard to say. But should I be so understood that things being as they were is things being 
as I said? About that there may be no doubt.
We have arrived at the new picture of what representing is. What I said to be so in 
representing things as some given way is what it ought to be given how one ought to 
expect to be able (or need) to act on what I said as the introduction rules of a good game 
with a point  are what they ought to be given the elimination rules they mesh with. 
Questions as to what it is I said—where I spoke of things being thus and so, on what 
understanding of their so being I in fact spoke—are thus answered by our common 
parochial sense for what ought to be expected of my speaking as I did in the 
circumstances in which I did—in the artificial terms here used to make the point, by our 
parochial sense for the games I was, or would be, playing in speaking as I did, on our 
present notion of what it would be for me to be playing a language game in speaking, 
say, English.
5. Truth:  A further contrast with Frege’s view may help focus the new picture. Frege’s 
conception of a truth bearer (1918) starts from this question:
Is a picture as bare visible, tangible, thing really true? And a stone, 
or leaf, not true? (1918, p. 59)
The answer is, clearly, no. A picture, so conceived, might represent anything, or nothing, 
as so. So far, as Frege sees it, there is no intelligible question as to whether what it 
represented as so is so. There is no ‘what it represented as so’. And (a critical 
assumption), one cannot ask whether words represented as so what is so except by 
asking of that which they represent as so (that such-and-such) whether that is so. 
Suppose a painting does represent something as so—something, say, as to how the 
cathedral at Rouen looks. No question of truth arises, the idea is, until it is fixed just how 
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the cathedral is thus supposed to look. Only with that fixed can we ask whether the 
cathedral is as represented. Suppose the painting is a Monet. In its image of a wall is a 
patch of blue paint. Does this represent it as so that the cathedral has a partly blue wall? 
Or that the wall was in shadow at the time it was painted? Monet’s ways aside, there is 
no saying. If not, the idea is, no (determinate) question of truth has arisen.
A question of truth thus arises for Frege only where there is no unanswered one of 
this form: ‘Is the representation to be taken as representing this as so, or rather that?’ For 
what raises a question of truth, there is no such open question as to what is so according 
to it; when things would be as it represents them. Frege thinks that beginning with 
visible, tangible representations we can arrive at non-visible, non-tangible, 
representations which meet this condition—and that any representation which did so 
would be neither visible nor tangible.
This conviction is another version of the idea from which I have already signalled 
Wittgenstein as departing: the idea that a concept is a function from objects to truth-
values. Suppose there is an identifiable way for things to be such that if things were 
represented as that way, there can be no further open question as to whether they were 
thus represented as this way, or rather that. Such a way for things to be would admit no 
understandings. The zero-place concept of it would thus map things  being as they are 
into a truth value. Where naming a (non-zero place) concept is a contribution to 
representing things as this way, the concept named could only behave as a function 
from objects to truth values would. What raises such a question of truth is a 
representation on a different understanding of that term: something to  represent as so. 
Such a thing (as Frege argues) is neither visible nor tangible.
That the parochial decides which  way words represented things is, for Frege, an 
anodyne idea. Whether ‘is dark’ then named one concept or another may all depend on 
us. But, on this conception, there is no role for the parochial once a question of truth has 
been raised. From the question when someone should be counted as having spoken 
truth—as having said no more than what is so—we have separated out a question 
which does not refer to him, or his utterance, at all: for a given thing that might be said, 
when that  thing would be true. On the Fregean idea, such a thing—something to 
represent  as so—is not susceptible to understandings, as mere visible, tangible 
representers—words, pictures, etc.—are. It is an understanding for such things to bear. 
So there is no role for the parochial, or anything else, in choosing between 
understandings of it.
A language game provides a different story. We can now abandon the idea that 
there are ways for things to be which brook no competing understandings; and the idea 
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that the only questions of truth are whether things are one or another of these ways. For 
any way for things to be, there may always be questions as to how one may expect to 
act on that, admitting of different, and competing answers on different occasions for 
considering a question how to act. On the other hand, on the new picture, words are 
true if one can do all they license, must do all they require if correct. How things are 
according to the words is then fixed by those standards for their introduction which 
such standards for their elimination impart.
If a painting represents part of a cathedral wall as blue, there is this question: 
Might it be true to represent the wall like that? The question may  have a clear answer. 
Or, again, not. There are all sorts of things it could be for a wall to be blue there; all sorts 
of understandings of it so being. Would a crude graffito  count? For each such thing, 
there are the language games in which it is what would so count. That there are such 
further understandings of being blue need not matter to truth in the case at hand (given 
the way the wall in fact is), though it might. As to whether the painting is subject to any 
such further standards of correctness—whether it is the playing of any such further 
games—this is a matter for the parochial to rule on, just as it does where Frege concedes 
it room to operate.
My calling the room dark raises a question of truth: Is  it dark on the 
understanding on which I spoke of that? This question still leaves room for the 
parochial to work. There are things to be decided as to the understanding of that on 
which I did so speak. Now, the idea is, say what you like as to what that understanding 
is, and there is still the same sort of room for the parochial to work. There is always 
room for fresh questions of truth to arise. Find new circumstances of which my words 
might be true or not, and there are, correspondingly, new language games for me to 
have been playing or not; games which provide for such circumstances in any of many 
ways (or none). With that, there is more of the usual work for the parochial to do. The 
parochial, like rust, never sleeps. On this new picture, as opposed to Frege’s, it never 
cancels out absolutely.
Invisible, intangible truth bearers thus lose the special status Frege accords them. 
The parochial takes on an ineliminable role in representing as so. Such a view must be 
seen as a picture of what representing is as such—though it is as yet unclear how it 
could be that. Which sets an agenda for much of what follows this opening move in the 
Investigations. I now turn to that agenda, and one bit of its execution. 
6. Thinking, Meaning, Understanding: So far I have discussed the work of the first 27 
paragraphs of the Investigations. It sets an agenda for much, if not all, of the rest.
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, notably for the rule following discussion (§§84-87, §§138-242). Two issues are on that 
agenda.
One agenda item is to apply the new idea of rerpesentation to a sort not yet in the 
picture. I have spoken above of what belongs to representation as such. So far we have 
considered only linguistic representation: representation in, or by, vehicles. I utter some 
words, or make some signs by waving my hands, or use smoke signals, or whatever, to 
which one is to react in a certain way. The signs—the physical bearers of this way of 
being taken—make my representing perceivable, so that you can be aware of being 
represented to, and then, if things go well, take yourself to be represented to in a certain 
way. Where there is such a thing as how signs are to be taken, a parochial sensibility 
may decide that. Wittgenstein’s point could then just be that there are no bounds on the 
room for such decision—what Frege suggests there must be for there to be questions of 
truth at all.
But representing with such a physical face to it—with bearers of content—is one 
case of two. There is representing to, or for, an audience—those who are to take the 
representing in one way or another. Then there is representing things to oneself as so. 
One can be the sole intended audience for representing of the first type: I leave myself a 
note (which, on finding, I may  disbelieve). But there is a case where it is not that. 
Representing something as so may just be taking (holding) a certain view. I will call that 
autorepresentation. For me to think that my keys are in my pocket is, per se, for me to 
represent the world to myself as a certain way. For me to represent the world to myself 
as a certain way is for me to stand towards it in a certain way—in a certain posture. To 
write a note would not be so to stand. Representational vehicles have no clear role in 
my so standing (though some have postulated them by way of supposed empirical 
hypothesis). Nor, in any clear sense, is my representing something to myself as so 
something that is to be taken in one or another way, so that a parochial sensibility might 
decide how.
Where there is something which is to be taken in a certain way, there is a role for 
the parochial to have: determining what  way. Autorepresentation seems to involve no 
such thing. So it is as yet unclear what role the parochial could have there; so how the 
new picture applies. The first agenda item is to see how it might.
The second is to see what calls for the new picture. This, I will argue, is the task of 
the rule following discussions (§§84-87 and §§138-242). This section treats the first item, 
the next section the second. As a preliminary, though, I now summarize that first 
discussion. §§84-87 discusses how the explanations we give one another can explain—
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can say no less than what to do, or how things are. I tell you, ‘To find the post office turn 
right at the second street’, or, if that does not suffice, ‘That alleyway is not a street.’ I 
may thus tell you no less than what route to follow. The instruction, ‘Turn right at the 
second street admits of competing understandings, as does every other. For all of which 
my giving of it need not. My explanations, the things I say, are for thinkers of the sort we 
are, or those I give (say) them to. Such thinkers would take them in a certain way. Such is 
part of being the sort they are. What explanations which are for such thinkers in fact say 
is what they would thus be taken to. Their content is formed by the sort of thinker they 
are for; thus by what is peculiar to thinkers of a certain sort—by what is parochial. “The 
sign-post is in order—if it meets its aims in normal circumstances” (§87). It is aimed at a 
certain sort of thinker. Its content is what its aims and their fulfilment make it. I will 
apply this idea to the first agenda item.
How, then, does the new picture apply to autorepresentation? I will focus on one 
case of it: someone meaning his words in a certain way—so as to say such-and-such. 
Here meaning is what someone does, not what what ‘vrijgezel’ does in meaning bachelor. 
It is non-factive, so unlike Pia’s frown meaning Sid is driving. I meant to post the letter. I 
meant to say ‘begleiten’, not ‘beledigen’. It aims at something, with all the usual 
accompaniments of that. If I mean to say X to be so, and for X to be so just is for Y to be 
so, I need not have meant to say Y to be so. Which need not mean that I can mean to say 
something where there is no such thing to say. What can one mean the words one 
speaks to say? One one view, anything one can think. Thus, as Wittgenstein portrays the 
view (§205),
“But it is just the queer thing about intention, about the mental 
process, that the existence of a custom, of a technique, is not 
necessary to it.”
The counter idea here can be put: Ignorance is strength. A small child can jump off a tall 
building and try to fly—if, as may be with a small child, he does not know that he 
cannot do this. But only if that. I can jump off a tall building and flap my arms. But I 
cannot thus be trying to fly. For I know I cannot. You cannot try to do what you are fully 
convinced you cannot do. So I cannot, in the bakery, try to ask for bread by saying, 
‘Would you like to go for a drink?’ At least not in normal circumstances. For, as I know 
full well, I will not have asked for bread in doing that. English does not work that way. I 
am a competent speaker of English. So I know what I will say (if anything) in the bakery 
in uttering ‘Would you like to go for a drink?’ So, contraposing ‘Ignorance is strength’, I 
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cannot try, in so speaking, to ask for bread. So I cannot mean my words to be asking for 
bread.
Insofar as I am competent—I know what would be said in speaking given words 
on a given occasion—I can only mean my words to say what they will, in fact, say. If I 
say ‘The room is dark’ in circumstances in which that would be taken to mean it is safe 
to remove film, and I know this is how it would be taken, I cannot, consistent with that, 
mean my words to say that the room is dark on some other understanding of it so 
being. The new picture of representation now applies. What would I say, on a given 
occasion, in saying, ‘The room is dark’? Refer to the new picture. Now insofar as I am 
competent, that is what I meant my words to say.
My readers and I are all competent in speaking English, but none of us perfectly 
so. Even where competent enough, we do not always see what we will say in uttering 
given words on a given occasion. We may always fail to appreciate fully the 
circumstances in which we speak. I may, say, misuse the word ‘careen’ because I do not 
know, or properly grasp, its nautical origins. Or I may misuse it in a particular situation 
because though I do know those origins, my audience does not, so that I am aiming for 
a metaphor unrealizable under the circumstances. A boat tilting from side to side in 
high seas may be said to be careening (on what is now, anyway, one recognized use). I 
might think of a truck heaped high, creeping from the dust bowl towards California, as 
like such a ship. So I speak of it as careening down the road. The metaphor falls flat. I do 
not say what I mean to. Equally, I might threaten someone, ‘I’ll careen you’, and not 
succeed in saying what I mean to say—that I will keelhaul him—because that meaning 
of ‘careen’ is currently unknown.
There is that much room for divergence between what I mean my words to say 
and what they do say. None of which spoils the core in the idea that ignorance is 
strength. I thought ‘careen’ meant keelhaul. In the context I used it, it did not. But we 
know what it would be (roughly) for a word to mean keelhaul. The word ‘keelhaul’ 
means that, for example. Suppose ‘careen’ had meant keelhaul  (in that context). What 
would I then have said? In the above case, that is what I meant my words to say. Again, 
the new picture of representation stays in place. Suppose I drag you under my canoe. 
Would that be keelhauling on the understanding of this on which that is what I would 
have threatened my audience with?
My perceptions as to what I would say in given words may intelligibly deviate 
from what is so. They may be, understandably, that I would say such-and-else there is 
to be said. Then, in choosing my words as I did, that is what I meant to say. I was able to 
suppose I would then speak, in those words, of things being such-and-such way. So I 
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meant them to speak of that. I was able to suppose the circumstances to be thus and so. 
So I meant thus to say what one would in speaking of things as that way in such 
circumstances. When would things be  as I thus meant to say they were? Well, what 
language games would I be playing were my suppositions so? Our new idea of what 
representation is now takes its grip. How I meant things were now falls within the 
scope of the parochial.
Here, then, one illustration of how the new picture can be a picture of 
autorepresentation. Details differ from case to case. There is a further point. In saying 
Sid to think the room is dark, one might say him to think any of various things, 
depending on what, for purposes of so saying, one is to understand by a room being 
dark. But not: What Sid thinks in thinking the room dark (where he so thinks) depends 
on what one understands by a room being dark. (Nor even, I think, on what he 
understands by this.) Rather, in thinking the room dark, Sid thinks something so. What 
can be thought  so is what, ceteris paribus, either is  so or not. Which it is can then only 
depend on how things are. Equally, then, for whether things are as he thus thinks. So 
equally again for what he thus thinks. There is (roughly) no room here for whether 
things are as Sid thinks to depend on what one understands by a room being dark; 
equally little for what he thus thinks to so depend.
So far what Sid thinks seems to follow the pattern of a Fregean truth-bearer. Such a 
truth-bearer represents things as such-and-such way, where there are just no competing 
understandings of something being that way; so whether something is that way cannot 
depend on what you understand by something so being. Similarly, what Sid thinks in 
thinking what he does here is that things are a certain way; whether things are as he 
thus thinks cannot, it seems depend on what one understandings by things being such-
and-such way, for any  substitution for that ‘such-and-such’. The phenomenon of 
thinking so seems to take this shape. Such may be one important source of the idea of a 
Fregean truth-bearer. But how can  there be objects of thinking so—thoughts, or 
propositions—which thus admit of no competing understandings? We need to 
understand the terms of the line of thought, above, which can seem to suggest so.
Wittgenstein explores this topic in §§429-465. The key idea here is:
‘An order orders its own execution.’ So it knows its execution before 
it is there?—But that was a grammatical proposition, and it says: If 
the order runs ‘Do such-and-such’ then carrying out the order is 
called ‘doing such-and-such’. (§458)
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‘If you said that Sid grunts, what you thus said would be true iff Sid grunts.’ Whether 
this states truth depends on what one understands saying that Sid grunts to be. But if 
we understand this antecedent as speaking of your having said such-and-such to be so, 
where that is (presumably) something so or not—if, that is, we understand it as we did 
Sid’s thinking something so, above—then the remark is a truism, unfolding part 
(though not all) of the concept of truth; a grammatical proposition in Wittgenstein’s 
sense. But why? In the consequent, the words ‘Sid grunts’ speak of Sid being a way he 
(presumably) is or not. To do that, they must bear some particular understanding of 
being a grunter. If I  made this remark, then I spoke, in that part of it, of Sid being a 
grunter, on some particular understanding of him so being. In the antecedent I speak of 
you speaking of Sid being a grunter. Again, if I thus speak of you saying things to be 
thus and so, then I thus speak of Sid being a grunter on some particular understanding 
of him so being. And now a grammatical point: it must be the same understanding both 
times, which guarantees the truth of the whole. Which is to say nothing as to just what 
understanding this might be. So far we have learned nothing as to just when you would 
be right.
Suppose now that I say ‘If Sid thinks the room is dark, what he thinks is so just in 
case the room is dark.’ If, in the antecedent, I speak of Sid thinking things to be thus and 
so, then all the above remarks apply. In the consequent I use the words ‘the room is 
dark’ to speak of a room as dark on some particular understanding of its so being. In the 
antecedent I do the same. In the consequent I do it to say how things must be for Sid to 
be right. In the antecedent I do it to say what it is he will be right or wrong about. 
Again, necessarily, one understanding of a room being dark is in force throughout. 
Again we so far know nothing as to what it is Sid thinks.
‘In thinking the room dark, Sid thinks something so; which is  so, or not, 
independent of what you understand by a room being dark, or by things being any 
other given way.’ That is so in just the way it is so that if I say the room to be dark, I thus 
say something so; which is so, or not, independent of what you understand by a room 
being dark. So things are as I said, or not, independent of any such understanding, just 
as things are as Sid thus thought independent of this. Neither truism suggests Fregean 
truth-bearers. Rather, the parochial retains the role assigned it, on our new idea of 
representing, equally, in the one case, in making determinate what it is I said, and when 
things would be  as thus said, and, in the other, what it is Sid thinks, and when things 
would be as thought. That role once played, there is no need for playing it anew in 
fixing those understanding which, as we saw above, are not there to be fixed. (But if Sid 
thinks the room dark, could it not turn out that whether he thus thinks correctly depends 
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on what you understand by being correct in so thinking? Of course.)
7. Particular and General: For Frege there is something on which the parochial must be 
silent: when (in what particular cases) things would be thus and so. A way for things to 
be speaks for itself in all such matters. If such speaking is meant to silence the parochial, 
then for Wittgenstein the idea is incoherent. Here is the key point:
We say “The order orders this—” and do it; but also “The order 
orders this: I am to … .” We translate it at one time into a 
proposition, at another into a demonstration, and at another into 
action.” (§459)
Such translation—from something to be done to a case of doing it, from things being 
such-and-such way to a case of their so being—is blocked where the parochial is so 
silenced—for reasons Frege himself identifies. The rule following discussion points this 
out. Wittgenstein is here most deeply Fregean.
There is, Frege notes, something intrinsically general about a thought:
A thought always contains something reaching out beyond the 
particular case so that this is presented to us as falling under 
something general. (Frege 1906? (1979): 175)
Reaching beyond the particular case: a thought true of things as they are might still 
have been true without things being just as they are (in every respect). Nor need things 
have been just as they are in order for there to have been such a thought at all. If it is 
true that my cup is empty, it might still have been had it just been drained of different 
tea. Were it undrained, there would still be the thought that it is empty.
The generality of thoughts is found in a notion of a way for things to be. Being 
empty is a way for a cup to be. Being fuller than is a way for an ordered pair of cups to 
be. My cup being empty is a way for things to be. My cup being as it is may be (or not) 
its being empty. As I will say, it may instance this (or not). Not everything about my cup 
matters to it, as it is, instancing being empty (whereas everything about it matters to its 
being as it is). What being empty is fixes what does matter and how; what is demanded 
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for qualifying as an instance. There is an indefinitely extensible range of cases of what 
would instance being empty; equally, a range of different ways of being (doing) what a 
thing thus must.
That my cup is now empty is not a way for things to be. It is the circumstance of 
things so being. In things being as they are, they are so. There is indefinite variety in the 
way things could be while so being (that my cup is empty). There is, again, a range of 
cases. So the generality of a way for things to be (as I will say, of the conceptual) is the 
generality of thoughts, equally, of that which is so according to them.
‘A satisfies (falls under) the concept W’ is here just a variant for ‘A’s being as it is is 
its being W.’ A concept is, intrinsically, of being thus and so. A concept may be satisfied 
by single items, by order pairs, and so on. A zero-place concept is a thought, which is 
satisfied, or would be, by things being as they are, or were.
There is a class of concepts (the first-order ones) which are satisfied by what is not 
itself conceptual. The characteristic mark of the non-conceptual (the particular, as I will 
say) is that there is no range of cases of something’s being as it is being it (much as there 
is no range of different items, each of which would be Frege on some satisfiable 
condition).
There is no satisfying the particular. It makes no demands on, so nothing could 
matter to, so doing. My cup is not a way for things to be. Nothing’s being as it is would 
be its my cup. There is, by contrast, such a thing as being my cup. This is  a way for 
things to be. To be sure, the only thing that could be that way is my cup. But my cup 
may do that chipped, in Dublin, and so forth. There is a range of cases here.
What satisfies a concept? In mathematics, one can say, ‘an object’. The number 2 
satisfies the concept smallest prime. In sublunary affairs this will not do. My cup satisfies 
the concept empty. Now  it does. It is about to cease. Tea is on the way. It is my cup’s 
being as it is now that is its being empty. This is what satisfies concepts. Equally for 0-
place concepts. It is things being as they are which is its being so that my cup is empty. 
There is no range of cases of my cup being as it now is. To be that, a thing would need 
to be that cup, as it now is. There is just one case of that. So my cup’s being as it is, things 
being as they are, belong to the particular. My cup is the way it is. But that is not a way 
for a thing to be; only a way for my cup now to be. Terminology should not mislead us 
into misclassifying my cup’s being as it is with the conceptual.
In defending his idea of the invisibility of truth-bearers Frege points to a crucial 
difference between particular and conceptual. My cup—a particular—is visible. That 
my cup is empty is not visible on the same understanding of visible. For, for my cup to 
be empty is for things being as they are to belong to a certain range of cases. To see that 
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it is empty, one must recognize the membership. Neither such membership, nor the 
range thus joined, are visible things. One cannot see that to which precisely what would 
be cases of a cup being empty belong; nor are those other cases themselves in sight. (See 
Frege, 1897/1979, pp. 137-138, and 1918, p. 61.)
Frege tells us that the particular’s relation to the general in belonging to ranges is 
the fundamental logical relation. In his words,
The fundamental logical relation is that of an object’s falling under a 
concept: all relations between concepts reduce to it. (Frege 
1892-1895/1979, p. 118.)
For a way for things to be, or concept, to bear this relation to given particulars is for a 
generality to reach all the way to the particular case—Wittgenstein’s translation from 
order to action: I am to do such-and-such; I am to do this (doing it). A cup’s being empty 
is a cup being empty; this is a cup being empty.
The rule-following discussion concerns this fundamental relation. What is it for 
this to hold? When would it? What might answer these questions? The relation holds 
between my cup as it now is and its being empty, but not between my cup as it is about 
to be and its being empty. What is the difference? The obvious answer: my cup is now 
empty, but is about not to be. But that is just to say: the relation holds where it holds, 
and does not where it does not. It does nothing to explain its holding: to say why it is, 
or how it can be, that the cases of its holding are just the ones they are. (Why, e.g., my 
cup’s being as it is bears it to a cup being empty, while other things do not.) Suppose 
one answered that question by citing some condition on its holding: the relation would 
hold just where that condition was satisfied. Such a condition belongs to the conceptual. 
How does it translate to instances of its  satisfaction? We might thus be told when the 
non-conceptual would relate to the conceptual if we already knew enough as to when it 
would. That there might be such an answer was never in doubt. But it is hard to see how 
that could answer the question posed.
What is  to be said as to when the fundamental relation holds? We can explain a 
given instance of its holding in terms of other instances of its holding—my cup is empty 
if innocent of liquid. Or we may cite examples of its holding. But there seems nothing else 
to say. We understand relations within the conceptual in terms of the fundamental 
relation, falling under. We cannot understand it  in the same way. But perhaps in no 
other way either. Which fits with Frege’s conception of the zero-place case. For things 
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being as they are to fall under the zero-place concept of my cup’s (now) being empty is 
just for it to be true that my cup is empty. Truth, Frege tells us, is indefinable 
(equivalently, truth is part of the content of any judgement). To know when it would be 
true that my cup is empty is just to know when my cup would be empty. But what we 
wanted to know in the first place is in just what instances this would be so. To know 
what would fall under my cup being empty  is to know what the correct transitions are 
from the conceptual, my cup being empty, to the particular cases of what are, or not, its 
instances. But what is it for given transitions to be the right ones? How can  there be 
something to be known here?
I can, it seems, only explain the instancing of the relation by my cup (as it is) and 
being empty by appeal to other instances of the relation. So perhaps asking for more 
than this is asking a bad question. Frege says something on these lines for questions as 
to why a law of logic holds. Such may admit of explanation within logic. But it admits of 
no extra-logical explanation. (See Frege 1893: xviii) In logical matters, there is no such 
thing as things being other than as logic has them. For, insofar as there were, there 
would be room for explanation as to why things were not  otherwise; such explanation 
being, necessarily, extra-logical.
But if there is no such thing as saying why logic is not otherwise, one can say why 
this is so. Logic (on Frege’s conception) unfolds the most general structure of 
judgement, or truth. What was not so structured would, ipso facto, not be judgement, 
nor truth. Being so structured belongs  to the concept judgement, which we have just 
understood in terms of the fundamental relation. So there is no such thing as thought 
being otherwise than logic says; but all logic says is how thought must be. (I do not 
defend this story. What matters here is just its availability.)
Now the thought would be: perhaps there is no saying why the fundamental 
relation is instanced as it is and not otherwise in the same way as there is no saying why 
logic is as it is and not otherwise. We need to work out what this means. But there is at 
the start a crucial disanalogy. Logic traces relations within the conceptual. It does not 
speak to, but rather presupposes, the fundamental relation. If, as Frege says, truth is 
part of every judgement, then knowing when it would be true that my cup is empty is 
just knowing when my cup would be empty. So when it would be is part of what truth 
is. But logic is not concerned with that part. What we want to see, then, is whether those 
same ideas as to there being no such thing as otherwise, which find some application for 
that part of thought, or truth, which logic does unfold also apply for that part which it 
does not.
Logic, conceived so as to fit Frege’s story, deals in a certain structure which is 
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intrinsic to the conceptual; a certain way in which given bits of the conceptual relate to 
others. To repeat, relations between bits of the conceptual are understandable in terms 
of the fundamental relation. It is in terms of such understanding that we can 
understand what it is for such a relation to hold intrinsically. If Frege’s story fits, then 
this understanding of intrinsic  will make sense of the relevant idea of there being no 
such thing as things being otherwise. But we do not have the same means at our 
disposal for understanding the fundamental relation itself; so nor for understanding 
what it could be for it to have a certain structure intrinsically.
This idea has work to do. Take any instance of the fundamental relation holding, 
or of it not, between some particular and some concept—say, between my cup as it now 
is and the concept empty. If the relation holds, then it is part of what being empty is that 
my cup’s being as it is is so to count. That is the  correct translation from being empty 
being such-and-such to its being this. Any competing one is a mistake. But there is no 
saying what makes this so. So that this is correct must be intrinsic to the structure of 
falling under: whatever did not have that feature simply could not be that relation. 
Similarly for every instance. How to understand that?
The picture is now this. There is no saying why falling under  has the instances it 
does (except why it has certain ones given that it has certain others). For it is intrinsic to 
it to have precisely those instances that it does. Since the ordered pair, <my cup as it now 
is, being empty>, instances falling under  just in case my cup as it now is instances being 
empty, the same goes for every concept. It is equally intrinsic to being empty to have just 
the instances it does. All of this is part of the intrinsic  structure of the relation of the 
conceptual to the particular. But we do not yet understand what intrinsic  could mean 
here. We understand its application within the conceptual because we understand the 
conceptual in terms of the fundamental relation. We cannot have that understanding of 
it applied to relations between the conceptual and something else. Which leaves us, so 
far, with no understanding at all.
If my cup’s being as it is is its being empty, one can rightly say: it is part of what 
being empty is that this particular is to count as something being empty. What we want 
to understand is what  truth we thus state. The wanted reading cannot plausibly be: 
anything which did not have just this instance would not be being empty. There are two 
reasons. The first is the point with which the Investigations  opens. The concept concept 
does not work like that. My cup is at the bottom of the fish tank, along with others. The 
others are all filled with fish food. Mine is not. Is mine empty? We would still be 
speaking of being empty if we spoke so as to count it as that way, but also if we spoke so 
as to count it as not that way (water being what it is). It is not intrinsic to being empty to 
be instanced by precisely what may so count. This point points in several directions. 
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Here it makes vivid an understanding on which the conceptual does not relate 
intrinsically to the particulars which instance it—to this  being as it happens to be. 
Whatever we count as its instances, a bit of the conceptual—a way for things to be—
does not require just those  for being the way for things to be it is. That would be a 
misreading of the correct idea that this just is what it is for something to be empty.
The second point. My cup might have been full. Had it been, there would, and 
could, not have been that very particular, my cup’s being as it is, which in fact bears the 
falling under relation to being empty. Being empty would still have been the very thing 
it is. Ten minutes from now my cup will be as it then happens to be. Its being as it then 
is may be its being empty, or, again, may not. What way for a thing to be being empty is 
will be the same no matter what the outcome. So, again, there being such a thing as 
being empty, and its being what it is, does not turn on just which instances this turns 
out to have. That, again, is an understanding on which it is not intrinsic to being empty 
(or to any bit of the conceptual) to have just the instances it does.
What is intrinsic  to being empty is what would belong to it no matter what its 
instances happened to be; ways one could think it to be while thoughts about any given 
instance of it were unavailable (while the instance was not available to think of). So it 
cannot be intrinsic to it to bear the fundamental relation to what might not have been: 
my cup’s being as it now is. Mutatis mutandis for the fundamental relation. Nor could it 
be intrinsic to my cup’s being as it now is that things being precisely that way bears the 
fundamental relation to that bit of the conceptual, the cup’s being empty, as if were this 
not so to count my cup would not be as it now is.
Our aim is to understand (and not to impeach) the transition from what being 
empty is—being thus and so—to the particular case—my cup, as it will be in ten 
minutes, being that way, or, again, not. We have found no help in the idea that all 
instances of the fundamental relation are intrinsic to its structure, thus impervious to 
explanation. It is hard to see how ‘intrinsic’ could bear an understanding on which this 
was both true and an advance in understanding.
Which is just to develop Frege’s idea. We can understand relations between bits of 
the conceptual in terms of the fundamental relation—one between particulars and the 
conceptual. We can thus give sense to the idea (whatever its merits) of such relations 
holding intrinsically. But we cannot understand the fundamental relation itself in such a 
way. So nor can we so understand what it would be for it to hold intrinsically between 
such-and-such particular and such-and-such bit of the conceptual. Nor would it accord 
with our understanding of the conceptual—of concept, of way for things to be—to equate 
‘holds intrinsically’ with ‘just does’. In fact, it is simply obscure what ‘intrinsically’ 
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could mean here.
One understands falling under  in grasping, e.g., when things would count as my 
cup being empty; just as one grasps what truth is in grasping such things as how the 
world decides the correctness of a judgement that a cup is empty. Here the first rule-
following discussion (§§84-87) comes into play. I can explain (rightly or wrongly) where 
the post office is by pointing the way. What I thus explain—how I say to go—is fixed by 
how such explanation would be taken by thinkers of the sort we are. As we saw in the 
previous section, with the parochial thus in operation, I can say, ‘The post office is 
closed’ and mean  it in a certain way; and my meaning can stop nowhere short of the 
particular case: instances of the fundamental relation. So if one can walk into the 
building, but the counters are all closed, things being just as they thus are can be their 
being as I meant, or, again, their not. The explanations we give, so the things we say, 
and mean, are, normally, for thinkers like us; which fact shapes how it is they represent 
things; so what the correct translations are from ‘he meant that/to do …’ to ‘he meant 
this’.
Thus  does my meaning stop nowhere short of the facts. (Cf. §95.) But the point 
now is: only with the parochial thus in operation is this so. When would a cup count as 
being empty? Exactly which instances of a cup being as it was would be it being that? 
When, that is, would it be the way I just asked about? Which way did I ask about? Now 
the above point applies. Operating as per the first rule-following discussion, the 
parochial fixes which way it is I spoke of, or meant. In this it stops nowhere short of 
fixing that way’s participation in the fundamental relation: which instances of things 
being thus are instances of their being that way. Here stopping nowhere short is stopping
—nowhere—short. Whatever the parochial achieves by way of relations between the bit 
of the conceptual I spoke of and other bits of the conceptual, this will not achieve 
relations between the way I spoke of and bits of the particular—those things which 
instance it. Such is just what it is for the fundamental relation not to be reducible to 
relations between concepts as relations between concepts are (on Frege’s view) 
reducible to it. Nor is there, operation of the parochial aside, any other way for there to 
be facts as to how being such-and-such way translates into being, for example, thus.
With the parochial at work, it can be correct to say that it is intrinsic to what being 
empty is that this  is a cup being empty: things could not be any other way in that 
respect. For it to count as true that the cup is empty may well be for such instancing to 
count as thus mandated. Not that there is some other mandating than that which the 
parochial allows for. Nor does this exclude what is sometimes so: that it is intrinsic to 
what being empty is that this is being empty—only on a certain understanding of what 
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being empty is.
The parochial reaches all the way from the conceptual to the particular. With that 
idea properly in place there is no problem as to how rational relations, such as falling 
under, can have given instances. Our parochial equipment grants us understandings of 
what it is for the fundamental relation to hold. No others are to be had.
The parochial is precisely that of which one cannot say, ‘There is no such thing as 
things being otherwise.’ It is part of human thought; thus of human life, of our ways of 
going right or wrong in our projects in, or for, the world. So, it is something 
psychological; part of how we are, not part of how any thinker must be. If the parochial 
forges transitions from the conceptual to the particular, as just sketched, then, with this 
in mind, it can seem that:
We are at most under a psychological, not a logical, compulsion. 
And now it looks quite as if we knew of two kinds of case. (§140)
Logic does not treat relations between the conceptual and the particular. If logical 
compulsion is what logic  must place us under, then there is  no logical compulsion to 
count my cup’s being as it is as its being empty. But, while one might turn my cup over 
to see whether it is empty, one would not do so to see whether its being as it is is its 
being empty. Nor would I pass out questionnaires on trams to see whether I am getting 
such transitions right. Except insofar as being empty admits of understandings, there 
are few or no open questions as to what would so count. If I say, truly, that my cup is 
empty, that is because it does so count. We are rationally compelled, in pursuing the 
goal truth, to recognize those instances of the fundamental relation which in fact obtain. 
This remains so even if, for those bits of the conceptual we think in terms of, those 
instances are what would so count for thinkers such as us. Our exposure to risk of error 
is shaped by what we would, or could, count as error; what might abash us. Still, you 
must count my cup’s being as it is as its being empty (where that matters) if you are to 
reach the goal truth.
If it seems as though there must be some other sense in which our hand ought to be 
forced here—as if we knew of some other kind of compulsion than that just sketched—
then we need to recall the fundamental point of this discussion. We understand how 
there can be compulsion in transitions from one bit of the conceptual to another; an 
understanding available to us by reference to the fundamental relation. In the case of 
the fundamental relation itself we cannot understand compulsion in the same way. We 
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do not have the same means available. It is this that casts suspicion on the idea that we 
do know of two kinds of case.
If we were different sorts of thinkers we would speak to, and for, different sorts. 
That might change which ways for things to be we spoke of. We would at least speak on 
different understandings of things being as we said. What it would be for things to be 
the ways we thus spoke of, so when the world would bear the fundamental relation to 
the concepts we thus expressed (deployed as thus deployed) would change accordingly. 
Which does not mean that if we thought differently, my cup might be as it is without 
being empty. The conceptual that figures in our thought—the ways we think of things 
as being or not—is formed by that thought. It is, for all that, the conceptual, relating to the 
particular as is the conceptual’s prerogative. There is no other  way of enjoying those 
prerogatives.
Such is the moral of the rule-following discussion. In drawing out this line of 
thought in the Investigations  I have had two morals of my own in mind. First, to 
understand Wittgenstein it is always a good idea to think of Frege. Second, and 
correlatively, the Investigations  treats the very same problems that concerned Frege. It 
speaks to his concerns. These morals are for those—both admirers and detractors—who 
share the view that at some point, probably around the summer of 1930, Wittgenstein 
had an experience like Saul’s fall on the road, or Godard’s, thus abandoning philosophy 
for some new form of self-help. The Investigations  offers new approaches to problems 
very much philosophy’s.
Charles Travis
King’s College London
March 2007
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